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1. Introduction 
Operating experience from different industries has shown a considerable number of 
reportable events with non-chemical explosions and rapid fires resulting from high 
energy arcing faults (HEAF) in high voltage equipment such as circuit breakers and 
switchgears.  
High energy arcing faults can occur in an electrical system or component through an arc 
path to ground or lower voltage, if sufficiently high voltage is present at a conductor with 
the capacity to release a high amount of energy in an extremely short time. High energy 
arcing faults may lead to the sudden release of electrical energy through the air.  
The significant energy released in the arcing fault of a high voltage component rapidly 
vaporizes the metal conductors involved and can destroy the equipment involved. The 
intense radiant heat produced by the arc can cause significant damage or even destructions 
of equipment and can injure people. However, this problem has been underestimated in the 
past (Owen, 2011a and 2011b). 
Arcing events are not limited to the nuclear industry. Examples for such events could be 
found, among others, in chemical plants, waste incineration plants, and in conventional as 
well as in nuclear power plants underlining that high-energetic arcing faults are one of the 
main root causes of fires in rooms with electrical equipment (HDI-Gerling, 2009).  
An evaluation of several loss incidents in different types of industrial plants has shown that 
causes for the generation of arcing faults are mainly due to (HDI-Gerling, 2009): 
 contact faults at the screw-type or clamp connections of contactors, switches and other 
components due to, e.g., material fatigue, metal flow at pressure points, faulty or soiled 
clamp connections, 
 Creeping current due to humidity, dust, oil, coalification (creeping distances, arcing 
spots), 
 Mechanical damage due to shocks, vibration stress and rodent attack, 
 Insulation faults due to ageing (brittleness), introduction of foreign matter and external 
influences.  
Investigations of HEAF events have also indicated failures of fire barriers and their elements 
as well as of fire protection features due to pressure build-up in electric cabinets, 
transformers and/or compartments, which could lead to physical explosions and fire. These 
events often occur during routine maintenance. 
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HEAF have been noted to occur from poor physical connections between the equipment and 
the bus bars, environmental conditions and failure of the internal insulation (Brown et al., 
2009). 
The interest in fire events initiated by high energy arcing faults has grown in nuclear 
industry due to more recent events having occurred at several nuclear installations.  
In the ongoing discussion on an international level it appeared necessary to find a common 
understanding about the definition of high energy arcing faults.  
Currently, high energy arcing faults are seen as high energy, energetic or explosive electrical 
equipment faults resulting in a rapid release of electrical energy in the form of heat, 
vaporized metal (e.g. copper), and pressure increase due to high current arcs created 
between energized electrical conductors or between an energized electrical conductor and 
neutral or ground.  
Components that may be affected include specific high-energy electrical devices, such as 
switchgears, load centres, bus bars/ducts, transformers, cables, etc., operating mainly on 
voltage levels of more than 380 V (OECD/NEA, 2009a). 
The energetic fault scenario consists of two distinct phases, each with its own damage 
characteristics and detection/suppression response and effectiveness: 
1. First phase: Short, rapid release of electrical energy which may result in projectiles 
(from damaged electrical components or housing) and/or fire(s) involving the electrical 
device itself, as well as any external exposed combustibles, such as overhead exposed 
cable trays or nearby panels, that may be ignited during the energetic phase. 
2. Second phase, i.e., the ensuing fire(s): this fire is treated similar to other postulated fires 
within the zone of influence.  
However, a common definition of high energy arcing faults is expected as one result of a 
comprehensive international activity of the OECD on high energy arcing faults in  the 
member states of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) (see below). 
A variety of fire protection features may be affected in case of high energy arcing faults 
events by the rapid pressure increase and/or pressure waves (e.g. fire barriers such as walls 
and ceilings and their active elements, e.g. fire doors, fire dampers, penetration seals, etc.).  
The safety significance of such events with high energy arcing faults is non-negligible. 
Furthermore, these events may have the potential of event sequences strongly affecting the 
core damage frequency calculated in the frame of a probabilistic fire risk assessment. 
2. High energy arcing faults and work safety  
Although only the technical consequences for nuclear power plants and other nuclear 
installations in case of a HEAF event are discussed in the following in detail, another 
important hazard resulting from arcing faults should not be ignored. This is the possible 
injury of workers.  
Based on previous statistics it is expected that solely in the U.S. more than 2,000 workers 
will be seriously burnt by the explosive energy released during arcing faults within one year 
(Lang, 2005). The magnitude of this problem is far reaching, and the following statistics are 
staggering (Burkhart, 2009): 
 44,363 electricity-related injuries occurred between 1992 and 2001, 
 27,262 nonfatal electrical shock injuries, 
 17,101 burn injuries, 
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 2,000 workers admitted annually to burn centres for extended arc flash injury 
treatment. 
Three main consequences for workers result from a high energy arcing fault: blinding light, 
intense heat and thermo-acoustic effects.  
1. Blinding light:   
As the arc is first established, an extremely bright flash of light occurs. Although it 
diminishes as the arcing continues, the intensity of the light can cause immediate vision 
damage and increases the probability for future vision problems. 
2. Intense heat:  
The electrical current flowing through the ionized air creates tremendously high levels 
of heat energy. This heat is transferred to the developing plasma, which rapidly 
expands away from the source of supply. Tests have shown that heat densities at typical 
working distances can exceed 40 cal/cm². Even at much lower levels, conventional 
clothing ignites, causing severe, often fatal, burns. At typical arc fault durations a heat 
density of only 1.2 cal/cm² on exposed flash is enough to cause the onset of a second-
degree burn.  
3. Thermo-acoustic effects:   
As the conductive element that caused the arc is vaporized, the power delivered to the 
arc fault rises rapidly. Rapid heating of the arc and surrounding air corresponds to a 
rapid rise in surrounding pressure. The resultant shock wave can create impulse very 
high sound levels. Forces from the pressure wave can rupture eardrums, collapse lungs 
and cause fatal injuries. 
Most of these people will neither have been properly warned of the hazards associated with 
arc flash nor will they have been adequately trained in how to protect themselves. 
While the potential for arc flash does exist for as long as plants have been powered by 
electricity several factors have pushed arc flash prevention and protection to the forefront. 
The first is a greater understanding of arc flash hazards and the risk they pose to personnel. 
Research has started since a few years for quantifying energy and forces unleashed by arc 
flash events. This has resulted in the development of standards to better protect workers.  
Arc-flash hazard analysis is important in determining the personal protective equipment 
required to keep personnel safe when working with energized equipment. Contact with 
energized equipment is a commonly known risk; however exposure to incident energy from 
an electrical arc is sometimes overlooked.  On that background approach boundaries have 
been determined to improve the arc flash hazard protection (Lane, 2004) 
There is much discussion regarding how thorough an arc-flash hazard assessment must be. 
A complete examination of the system would require assessment at each and every possible 
work location, a task that is unrealistic to complete. Even if this task was undertaken, some 
of the accepted analysis methods pose some concerns as to whether the assessment 
considers the ΄most likely΄ fault scenarios. 
The fundamentals of arc-flash hazard analysis are discussed in (Avendt, 2008 and Lane, 
2004). The methodology used in the arc-flash hazard analysis is recommended in (IEEE, 
2002) where techniques for designers and facility operators are provided to determine the 
arc flash boundary and arc flash incident energy. How to use this IEEE standard is 
described in (Lippert et al., 2005). 
First and foremost, when considering arc-flash hazards four primary factors have to be 
mentioned which determine the hazard category: 
1. System voltage. 
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2. Bolted fault current – calculated at the location/equipment to be assessed and 
subsequently used to calculate the theoretical arcing fault current. 
3. Working distance – as measured from the personnel´s head/torso to the location of the 
arc source. 
4. Fault clearing time. 
Two of the four primary factors determining the arc-flash hazard category have a larger 
impact than the others: working distance and fault clearing time. 
In (Avendt, 2008) it is underlined that fault clearing time plays the largest role in the arc-
flash hazard category. A time-current curve is frequently used to show the relationship 
between current (amps) and response time (seconds). Most protective devices have an 
inverse characteristic: as current increase, time decreases. Examples of such curves are given 
in (Avendt, 2008).  
In order to fulfil the obligation to protect workers, several standards and guidelines are 
currently updated or under development.  
For example, the Electricity Engineers Association has developed a discussion paper on the 
issue of arc flash (EEA, 2010) that will enable the subsequent preparation of a guide which 
will provide best practice advice for employers and asset owners needing to determine the 
probability of an arc flash occurring, its severity, means of mitigation and relevant personnel 
protection equipment. 
An overview of various arc flash standards for arc flash protection and arc flash hazard 
incident energy calculations are presented in (Prasad, 2010).  
3. Systematic query of international and national databases 
In order to confirm these indications by feedback from national and world-wide operating 
experience, the national German database on reportable events occurring at nuclear power 
plants as well as international databases, such as  IRS (Incident Reporting System) and INES 
(International Nuclear Event Scale), both provided by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), or the OECD FIRE Database (cf. OECD/NEA, 2009) have been analysed 
with respect to high energy arcing faults events which resulted in a  fire and high energy 
arcing faults events with only the potential of deteriorating fire safety.  
That systematic query underlined that a non-negligible number of reportable events with 
electrically induced explosions and extremely fast fire sequences resulting from high energy 
arcing faults partly lead to significant consequences to the environment of impacted 
components exceeding typical fire effects. 
All results of the international and national databases are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 in 
the same manner, containing in particular the current plant operational state in case of the 
event, the information in which component the cause of the event was identified, the voltage 
level, if only the impacted component was damaged, and information if fire barriers being 
available had been deteriorated.  
3.1 International OECD HEAF activity 
Due to the high safety significance and importance to nuclear regulators OECD/NEA/CSNI 
(Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations) has initiated an international activity on 
“High Energy Arcing Faults (HEAF)” in 2009 (OECD/NEA, 2009a) to investigate these 
phenomena in nuclear power plants in more detail as an important part of better 
understanding fire risk at a nuclear power plants which is better accomplished by an 
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international group to pool international knowledge and research means. In this task it is 
stated:  
“The main objectives of this common international activity are to define in technical terms a 
HEAF event which is likely to occur on components such as breakers, transformers, etc., to 
share between experts from OECD/NEA member states HEAF events, experiences, research 
and potential mitigation strategies. In addition, the physical and chemical phenomena of a 
HEAF event shall be investigated and characterized from a fire dynamics perspective. In 
this context, a simple model and/or deterministic correlation is intended to be developed to 
reasonably and quickly predict the potential damage areas associated with a HEAF.  
Furthermore, generally acceptable input criteria and boundary conditions for CFD 
(computerized fluid dynamics) models shall be defined being likely to be accepted by 
industry and regulatory agencies. In a last step, the needs for possible experiments and 
testing to develop input data and boundary conditions for HEAF events to support the 
development of HEAF models shall be identified and the correlations and models 
developed be validated and verified.” 
The working group with members e.g. from Canada, France, Germany, Korea, and the 
United States decided during the Kick-Off Meeting at OECD/NEA in Paris in May 2009 that 
the goals of the task are to develop deterministic correlations to predict damage and 
establish a set of input data and boundary conditions for more detailed modelling which 
can be agreed to by the international community.  
The output of the OECD activity may directly support development of improved methods 
in fire probabilistic risk assessment for nuclear power plant applications. The task may also 
result in the definition of experimental needs to be addressed later in a project structure 
(OECD/NEA, 2009a). 
3.2 Information from of international databases 
First information from the international operating experience collected within the IRS 
database - for more severe reportable incidents at nuclear power plants - and INES, both 
provided by IAEA,  is given in Table 1. 
In addition, applications of the OECD FIRE Database (cf. OECD/NEA, 2009) have indicated 
that a non-negligible contribution of approx. 6 % of the in total 343 fire events collected in 
the database up to the end of 2008 (cf. Berg & Forell et al., 2009) are high energy arcing faults 
induced fire events. Details can be found in Table 2. 
At the time being, the existing data base on high energy arcing faults events in nuclear 
installations is still too small for a meaningful statistical evaluation.  
However, the first rough analysis of the available international operating experience gives 
some indications on the safety significance of this type of events, which potentially will also 
result in relevant contributions to the overall core damage frequency.  
Up to the end of 2009, thirty-eight high energy arcing faults events have been identified in 
the OECD FIRE Database. Details on these events are provided in the following paragraphs. 
The database query was started in Germany. One application of the OECD FIRE Database 
selected by the German experts was an analysis of events associated with explosions. A 
query in this database on the potential combinations of fire and explosion events (cf. Berg & 
Forell et al., 2009) indicated a significant number of explosion induced fires. Most of such 
event combinations occurred at transformers on-site, but outside of the nuclear power plant 
buildings or in compartments with electrical equipment.  
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Year of 
Occurrence 
Reactor 
Type 
Plant 
State 
Component 
Voltage 
Level 
Damage 
Limited to 
Component 
Barrier 
Deteriorated 
Fire / 
Explosion 
2006 PWR FP 
transformer 
busbar 
20 kV yes no F 
2006 BWR FP 
switchgear 
station 
400 kV yes no - 
2001 PHWR LP/SD
circuit breaker 
cables 
not 
indicated
no no F 
2001 PWR FP power switch 
not 
indicated
no no E / F 
2001 PWR FP circuit breaker 
not 
indicated
no yes F 
2000 PWR FP circuit breaker 6 kV yes yes F 
2000 PWR FP circuit breaker 12 kV yes no F 
1996 PWR FP power switch 
not 
indicated
no yes E / F 
1996 PWR FP lightning arrester
not 
indicated
no no F 
1995 PWR FP circuit breaker 6 kV no no E / F 
1992 PWR FP switchgear room 6 kV yes no F 
1991 PWR FP control cabinet 6 kV yes no F 
1991 PWR FP busbar 0.4 kV yes no F 
1990 PWR LP/SD
switchgear 
station 
400 V yes no - 
1990 PWR FP busbar 6 kV yes no - 
1990 LGR FP busbar 6 kV no no F 
1989 PWR FP distribution 6.9 kV no no E / F 
1988 PWR FP distribution 13.8 kV yes no E / F 
1984 BWR FP main transformer
not 
indicated
no yes E / F 
1983 GCR LP/SD control panel 5.5 kV no yes E / F 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Operating experience from HEAF events reported to INES and IRS (from Berg & 
Forell et al., 2009) 
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Year of 
Occurrence 
Reactor 
Type 
Plant 
State 
Component 
Voltage 
Level 
Damage 
Limited to 
Component
Barrier 
Deteriorated 
Fire / 
Explosion 
2007 PWR FP 
high voltage 
transformer 
not 
indicated 
/ 345 kV 
yes no E / F 
2006 PWR FP 
electrically driven 
pump 
12 kV yes no E / F 
2006 PWR FP 
high voltage 
transformer 
6 kV / 
20 kV 
no yes E / F 
2006 PWR LP/SD
medium and low 
voltage 
transformer - oil 
filled 
not 
indicated 
/ 400 kV 
no no E / F 
2005 BWR FP 
high voltage 
transformer 
not 
indicated
yes no E / F 
2005 PHWR FP 
high voltage 
transformer 
not 
indicated 
/ 500 kV 
yes no E / F 
2003 GCR FP 
high voltage 
transformer 
6.6 kV / 
400 kV 
no no E / F 
2002 BWR LP/SD
high voltage 
transformer 
not 
indicated
yes no E / F 
2002 PWR FP 
high voltage 
breaker 
34.5 kV yes no E / F 
2001 PWR LP/SD
high or medium 
voltage electrical 
cabinet 
6.6 kV no yes E / F 
2001 PWR 
not 
indicat
ed 
high or medium 
voltage electrical 
cabinet 
6.6 kV no no E / F 
1999 PWR FP 
high voltage 
transformer 
20 kV / 
161 kV 
yes no E / F 
1995 PWR FP 
medium and low 
voltage 
transformer – dry
not 
indicated 
/ 130 kV 
yes no E / F 
1994 PWR FP 
high voltage 
transformer 
not 
indicated 
/ 400 kV 
yes no E / F 
1990 PWR FP 
high or medium 
voltage electrical 
cabinet 
6.6 kV yes no E / F 
1988 PWR LP/SD
high voltage 
transformer 
20 kV / 
400 kV 
yes no E / F 
1988 PWR FP 
high voltage 
transformer 
20 kV / 
400 kV 
yes no E / F 
1988 PWR FP 
high voltage 
transformer 
20 kV / 
400 kV 
yes no E / F 
 
Table 2. Operating experience from fire events with HEAF included in the OECD FIRE 
Database (from Berg & Forell et al., 2009)  
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Approximately 50 % of the fires in the database were extinguished in the early (incipient) 
fire phase before the fire had fully developed.  
As there is no specific coded field in the database to indicate explosions, the main source of 
information is provided by the event description field. The following terms were used as 
search filters: 
- search for *explo* (explosion, exploded, etc.):   26 events 
- search for *defla* (deflagration, deflagrated, etc.):  no events 
- search for *deto* (detonation, detonated, etc.):   no events 
In three of the in total 26 cases no explosion occurred according to the event description but 
the term “explo” was used in another meaning.  
In case of one event, the explosive release of ‘INERGEN’ gas from a gas cylinder occurred. 
The 22 reported explosions amount to 6.4 % of the 373 events reported up to date. Some 
details of the explosions are listed in (Berg & Forell et. al., 2009). 
Concerning the process of explosion distinction should be made between an explosion as a 
process of rapid combustion (chemical explosion) and an explosion as a physical process 
resulting from a sudden gas pressure rise by a high energy arcing fault.  
A chemical explosion was found for only three events (solvent vapour, diesel fuel, 
hydrogen). In the other 18 cases, high energy arcing faults events obviously took place at the 
same time indicating a physical explosion.  
In some of these cases the electric fault might have caused a fuel pyrolysis/spread and acted 
as an ignition source for a chemical explosion, thus a high energy arcing fault event and a 
chemical explosion may have taken place simultaneously. In one event, a fire led to the 
explosion of diesel fuel vapour while in another event a fire and an explosion occurred 
independently from each other in parallel. In all other cases explosions induced the fire. 
The buildings/locations where the events took place are also listed in (Berg et al., 2009). It 
was found that 13 (59 %) events took place outside buildings, 3 inside electrical buildings. A 
majority of 59 % of the reported explosions (again 13 events) started at transformers.  
The other nine events took place at electrical cabinets, other electrical equipment, or process 
equipment (three each representing 14 %).  
External fire brigades were needed in 4 of 22 cases (18 %). The 22 events were also evaluated 
concerning the fire duration with the following results: 
- Fire duration between 0 and less than 15 min:        11 events 
- Fire duration between 15 and less than 30 min:          3 events 
- Fire duration between 30 and 60 min:            3 events 
- Fire duration longer than 60 min:           3 events 
For the remaining two events no information on the fire duration is provided. This result is 
in good agreement with the fire durations recorded in the database for all events, where for 
approx. 55 % of the events (i.e. 128 out of 233 events with fire duration provided) afire 
duration of less than 15 min could be found. 
3.3 Information from of the German database 
The German national operating experience from reportable events at nuclear power plants is 
summarized in Table 3. As one can see from this table different components were impacted, 
in particular – as expected – switchgears. In many cases the voltage level could not be 
identified. The damage was in most cases limited to the component where the HEAF 
occurred, only in one case a barrier was deteriorated. One third of these events were 
correlated with a fire. 
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Year of 
Occurrence 
Reactor 
Type 
Plant 
State 
Component 
Voltage 
Level 
Damage 
Limited to 
Component
Barrier 
Deteriorated 
Fire / 
Explosion 
2007 BWR FP transformer 380 kV yes no E / F 
2007 PWR FP transformer 380 kV yes no - 
2006 BWR LP/SD
auxiliary service 
pump 
not 
indicated
yes no - 
2006 PWR FP switchgear drawer
not 
indicated
yes no - 
2006 BWR FP switchgear drawer
not 
indicated
yes no - 
2005 BWR FP Switch 
not 
indicated
yes no - 
2004 PWR LP/SD
emergency power 
feed line 
not 
indicated
yes no - 
2004 BWR FP diesel generator 6 kV no no F 
2004 BWR FP cable connection 
not 
indicated
yes no F 
2004 PWR LP/SD
diesel generator. 
exciter 
6 kV yes no - 
2003 BWR FP 
diesel generator. 
exciter 
6 kV yes no - 
2003 PWR FP 
emergency power 
feed line 
500 V yes no F 
2002 BWR FP 
emergency power 
busbar 
500 V no no F 
2001 PWR FP 
generator 
transformer switch
not 
indicated
yes no - 
2001 BWR FP 
emergency power 
distribution 
660 V yes no - 
1999 PWR FP ventilation exhaust
not 
indicated
yes yes - 
1998 PWR FP 
emergency power 
distribution 
660 V no no - 
1996 BWR FP switch drawer 500 V yes no F 
1995 BWR FP switchgear drawer
not 
indicated
yes no - 
1993 PWR FP currency converter 380 V yes no - 
1992 PWR LP/SD
emergency power 
generator 
not 
indicated
yes no F 
1991 BWR FP 
emergency power 
busbar 
10 kV yes no - 
1989 PWR FP 
switchgear feed 
cell 
10 kV no no F 
1989 PWR LP/SD
switchgear feed 
area 
380 V? no no F 
1988 PWR LP/SD switchgear 220 kV no no E / F 
1987 BWR FP 
emergency diesel 
generator 
not 
indicated
yes no - 
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Year of 
Occurrence 
Reactor 
Type 
Plant 
State 
Component 
Voltage 
Level 
Damage 
Limited to 
Component
Barrier 
Deteriorated 
Fire / 
Explosion 
1987 PWR FP 
auxiliary service 
water system 
not 
indicated
yes no - 
1986 PWR LP/SD busbar 380 V no no F 
1984 BWR LP/SD
auxiliary power 
supply 
not 
indicated
yes no - 
1981 PWR FP 
safety injection 
pump motor 
not 
indicated
yes no - 
1979 BWR LP/SD switchgear 400 V yes no - 
1979 PWR LP/SD
control rod 
distribution 
not 
indicated
yes no F 
1978 PWR FP switchgear 220 kV yes no - 
1977 PWR LP/SD switchgear 350 V yes no - 
1977 BWR LP/SD
emergency 
switchgear 
not 
indicated
yes no - 
Table 3. Operating experience concerning reportable HEAF events from German NPP (from 
Berg & Forell et al., 2009) 
In all three tables the following abbreviations are used: 
PWR:  pressurized water reactor   BWR:  boiling water reactor 
PHWR:  pressurized heavy water reactor  GCR:  gas cooled reactor 
FP:  full power    LP/SD:  low power / shutdown 
E:  explosion    F:  fire 
4. Questionnaire to gain further insights on HEAF 
As a result of the evaluation of the above mentioned international databases IRS and INES, a 
questionnaire has been developed by German experts providing a list of questions, which 
mainly shall be answered by the licensees (see Röwekamp & Klindt, 2007 and Röwekamp et 
al., 2007).  
The answers to this questionnaire shall provide further insights on the basic phenomena 
regarding high energy arcing faults and may allow the evaluation of such events as well as 
the identification of effective preventive measures to be taken in nuclear installations in the 
future.  
This questionnaire has been discussed nationally and in an international experts group. The 
results of the international discussions as well as a first pilot completion of this 
questionnaire in a German nuclear power plant resulted in enhancing the questionnaire and 
its sub-division into two parts depending on the availability of experiences with this type of 
events in the plants under consideration.  
The questions concerning events which occurred at the nuclear power plant cover the 
operating experience in the respective plant, consequences and effects of the events, fire 
suppression measures (if needed), event causes and resulting corrective actions.  
Questions without plant-specific observations from events deal with preventive measures in 
the plant and assessment activities performed without direct observations from the events 
(Röwekamp & Berg, 2008 and Röwekamp et al., 2009). The complete list of elaborated 
questions is provided in the following.  
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Part I: Questions concerning events occurred at nuclear power plants 
 Operating experience 
1. Does the operating experience of the nuclear power plant (including grid 
connection) reveal either reportable or minor, non-reportable events interconnected 
to a high energy electric (i.e. arcing) failure of electric components and equipment 
with > 6 kV?  
2. What was the damage? What was the damage zone? Was there damage by the high 
energy release (explosion pressure wave, etc.), or by fire or by both?  
3. In which buildings / compartments / plant areas did the event occur? 
4. At what type of component was the fault initiated (e.g., switchgear, motor control 
centre, transformer (oil filled or dry ones), breakers, cables etc.)?  
5. What voltage level did the component operate at? What was the nominal current 
load available to the component? 
6. If known, what was the estimated overload current observed during the arcing 
fault? 
7. How was the HEAF observed or detected? Directly by fire detectors, visual or 
auditory detection in the location where the fault occurred or indirectly by 
faulty/spurious signals indirect fire alarms, etc.? (An as far as feasible detailed and 
exhaustive description of the event is needed.) What were the observations and 
findings? 
8. What was the arcing duration in case of arcing being the cause? How did the arcing 
stop? (Note: Due to expert judgment from international experts there may be a 
correlation between arcing duration and damage consequences/extent) 
 Consequences / Effects 
9. Which consequences/effects including secondary ones (e.g. pressure waves, impact 
by missiles, i.e. induced high frequent voltage, etc.) to adjacent/nearby 
components (including cables) and compartments / plant areas have been 
observed besides the typical fire effects? Did, as a consequence, protective 
equipment fail or become ineffective? 
10. Was the damage limited to one fire compartment and or one redundant safety train 
or were further compartments / trains affected? 
11. Which functions of fire protection features (fire barriers and their elements as well 
as active means) have been impaired by the effects of high energy arcing faults, in 
particular by pressure waves and missiles? 
 Fire suppression (if needed) 
12. Was fire extinguishing performed? 
13. If yes, which extinguishing means were applied? Which were successful? 
14. What was (rough estimate) the total fire duration? 
 Event causes 
15. Was it possible to find out the causes of the high energy impacts observed? If yes, 
what were the potential causes? 
16. Were the initial causes (root causes) man-induced (mal-operation, errors), or purely 
technical ones, administrative causes, or combinations of different causes? Have 
the root causes been found? (Please list all the root causes.) 
 Corrective actions 
17. What are the corrective actions after the event for prevention of recurrence? 
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Part II: Questions without observations from events at nuclear power plants 
 Preventive measures 
18. In which compartments / plant areas are components and equipment with the 
potential of HEAF installed? Are there safety significant / safety related 
components available in these compartments / plant areas and/or adjacent ones? If 
yes, which ones? What are the preventive (structural) measures there against such 
events? 
19. Which measures are foreseen (originally in the design as well as improved ones 
after the event) to limit the consequences of such high energy arcing faults failures? 
20. Is it possible to practically exclude by the preventive measures that safety 
significant equipment is impaired? 
21. Are further measures intended for prevention of these faults (continuous controls, 
in-service inspections, etc.), and if yes, which ones? 
 Assessment without direct observations from the events 
22. In how far are such high energy arcing fault events and their potential effects 
considered in the frame of periodic safety reviews (deterministic safety status 
analysis as well as probabilistic safety assessment)? 
This German questionnaire could be the basis for gaining plant-specific information also 
from nuclear power plants in other countries. 
5. Some examples of HEAF events in nuclear power plants 
In the following, typical examples of high energy arcing fault events which occurred in 
different nuclear power plants in the last thirty years are provided. 
5.1 HEAF in a 10 kV cable with a spontaneous short circuit 
A high energy arcing faults event from a spontaneous short circuit with a longer time 
duration took place in a German nuclear power plant.  
This event, which occurred in a 10 kV cable at a BWR type plant, has been analyzed in detail 
by the responsible expert organization on behalf of the regulator in charge (Berg & Katzer et 
al., 2009). Details on the electric circuit are provided in Figure 1.  
The affected cable was routed from the station service transformer together with various 
other cables through an underground cable channel to the switchgear building.  
Due to the conditions in the ground, cables were partly imbedded in so-called ‘cable 
cylinder blocks’ manufactured from concrete (see Figure 2). 
The short circuit with a duration of some seconds occurred in a single 10 kV cable inside one 
of the cylinder blocks. Neighboring cables were not affected. During this time period, the 
PVC insulated cable including the copper conductor evaporated completely on a length of 
approx. 1 m (see photos in Figure 3). 
The pyrolysis and/or evaporation of the PVC cable insulations caused a strong smoke 
release inside the cable channel.  
The automatic fire detectors directly gave an alarm. Due to the typically high air humidity 
inside the channel, a smoke exhaust system was installed for the cable channel, which 
removed the smoke rapidly after actuation by the fire detectors.  
The overpressure arising from the high voltage short circuit was relieved via open cable 
conduits to the transformer and leakages. 
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Fig. 1. Scheme of the electric circuit affected 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Cross section of the cable tray inside the cable cylinder blocks inside ground between 
the buildings 
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Fig. 3. Photos of the cable damage; left: location of the damaged cable, right: damage by the 
cable fire/evaporation 
 
Fig. 4. Cables with protection by intumescent coating; left: photo of the cable channel, right: 
photo of the coating 
Unfortunately, the pressure value having really occurred during the event could not been 
determined. Damage to fire doors, dampers, or fire stop seals were not observed. The high 
energy short circuit did not result in any fire propagation; the combustion was limited to the 
location where the short circuit occurred. The fire self-extinguished directly after the electric 
current had been switched off. The fire duration was only a few seconds, however, the 
smoke release was high.  
It has to be mentioned that all cables inside the cable channel were protected by intumescent 
coating (see Figure 4 above). This coating ensured the prevention of fire spreading on the 
cables. 
The detailed analysis led to the definite result that the event was mainly caused by ageing of 
the 10 kV cables. The ageing process was accelerated by the insufficient heat release inside 
the cable cylinder blocks. 
As a corrective action, all high voltage (mainly 10 kV) cables with PVC shielding being older 
than 30 years were replaced by new ones.  
Another effect of the event was the smoke propagation to an adjacent cable channels via a 
drainage sump. As a preventive measure, after the event each cable channel was supplied 
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by its own drainage system. Moreover, all the channels were separated by fire barriers with 
a resistance rating of 90 min. 
5.2 Arcing fault in an electrical cabinet of the exciter system of an emergency diesel 
generator 
This event occurred at a German nuclear power plant in 1987.  
 
  
 
Fig. 5. Photographs: a) view into the exciter cabinet, in the foreground location where the 
screw loosened and b) view into the cabinet 
 
 
Fig. 6. Photographs of the damaged fire door from outside the room 
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Performing a load test during a regular in-service inspection (usually at an interval of four 
weeks) of the emergency diesel generator, an arcing fault with a short-to-ground took place 
in the electrical cabinet of the exciter system of the emergency diesel generator (cf. Figure 5 
above).  
The ground fault is assumed to be caused by a loose screw. The ionization of air by the arc 
developed to a short circuit within approximately four seconds.  
The coupler breakers between the emergency power bus bar and the auxiliary bus bar 
opened 0.1 s after the occurrence of the short circuit, due to the signal “overload during 
parallel operation”.  
1.5 s later the diesel generator breaker opened due to the signal "voltage < min” at the 
emergency power bus bar. Another 0.5 s later the emergency power bus bar was connected 
automatically to the offsite power bus bar. 
The smouldering fire is believed to be caused by the short circuit of the emergency diesel 
generator.  
Due to the high energy electric arcing fault a sudden pressure rise occurred in the room 
(room dimensions are approximately 3.6 m x 5.5 m x 5 m) that damaged the double-winged 
fire door.  
Photographs of the damaged fire door from outside the room are shown in Figure 6 above. 
5.3 Short circuit leading to a transformer fire 
This event occurred at a German nuclear power plant in June 2007. A short circuit resulted 
in a fire in one of the two main transformers. The short circuit was recognized by the 
differential protection of the main transformer. Due to this, the circuit breaker between the 
380 kV grid connection and the affected generator transformer (AC01) as well as the 27 kV 
generator circuit breaker of the unaffected transformer (AC02) were opened.  
At the same time, de-excitation of the generator was actuated. The short circuit was thereby 
isolated. In addition, two of the four station service supply bus bars (3BC and 4BD) were 
switched to the 110 kV standby grid (VE). A simplified diagram is given in Figure 7 (Berg & 
Fritze, 2011).  
Within 0.5 s, the generator protection system (initiating 'generator distance relay' by 
remaining current during de-excitation of the generator which still feeds the shot circuit) 
caused the second circuit breaker between the 380 kV grid connection and the intact 
generator transformer (AC02) to open. Subsequently the two other station service supply 
bus bars (2BB and 1BA) were also switched to the standby grid. After approx. 1.7 s, station 
service supply was re-established by the standby grid.  
Due to the short low voltage signalization on station service supply bus bars the reactor 
protection system triggered a reactor trip. 
As soon as the switch to the standby grid had taken place , feed water pump 2 was started 
automatically. After about 4 s the pump stopped injecting into the reactor pressure vessel 
and subsequently was switched off again. This caused the coolant level in the reactor 
pressure vessel to drop so that after about 10 min the reactor protection system actuated 
steam line isolation as well as the start-up of the reactor core isolation cooling system. About 
4 min after the actuation of steam line isolation, two safety and relief valves were opened 
manually for about 4 min. This caused the pressure in the reactor to drop from 65 bar to 
approx.. 20 bar. As a result of the flow of steam into the pressure suppression pool, the 
coolant level in the reactor pressure vessel dropped further.  
www.intechopen.com
 Investigation of High Energy Arcing Fault Events in Nuclear Power Plants 
 
143 
 
Fig. 7. Simplified diagram of the station service supply and the grid connection of the 
nuclear power plant  
After closing the safety and relief valves the level of reactor coolant decreased further 
because of the collapse of steam bubbles inside the reactor pressure vessel. Thereby the limit 
for starting the high-pressure coolant injection system with 50 % feed rate was reached and 
the system was started up by the reactor protection system. Subsequently, the coolant level 
in the reactor pressure vessel increases to 14.07 m within 6 min. The reactor core isolation 
cooling system was then automatically switched off, followed by the automatic switch-over 
of the high-pressure coolant injection system to minimum flow operation. Subsequent 
reactor pressure vessel feeding was carried out by means of the control rod flushing water 
and the seal water.  
Due to the damage caused by the fire in the transformer, the plant was shut down. The fire 
of the transformer showed the normal behaviour of a big oil-filled transformer housing, the 
fire lacks combustion air and produces a large amount of smoke (see Figure 8). 
A detailed root cause analysis regarding the different deviations from the expected event 
sequence was carried out. The cause of the fire was a short circuit in the windings of the 
generator transformer. Due to the damages to the transformer it was not possible to resolve 
the failure mechanisms in all details.  
To end the short circuit, the differential protection system of the generator transformer 
caused to open the circuit breaker between the 380 kV grid connection and the affected 
generator transformer as well as the generator circuit breaker to the unaffected 
transformer.  
The generator circuit breaker to the affected transformer did not open since the generator 
circuit breakers are not able to interrupt the currents flowing during a short circuit. The 
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opening of the circuit breaker between the second 380 kV grid connection and the 
remaining intact generator transformer is caused by the remaining current after de-
exciting the generator which initiates the distance relay of the generator protection 
system.  
The loss of the operational feed water supply was caused by the time margins in between 
the opening of the two 380 kV circuit breakers. The logical sequence in the re-starting 
program of the feed water pumps could not cope with the specific situation of the delayed 
low voltage signals during the incident. 
The further drop in the reactor pressure vessel level following the actuation of steam line 
isolation and the reactor core isolation cooling system was caused by the manual opening of 
the two safety and relief valves for 4 min. The manual opening of safety and relief valves 
was not needed in the case of this event sequence and at that point in time. The reason for 
the manual opening of two safety and relief valves will be part of a detailed human factor 
analysis which is not completed. 
As a consequence of these indications, improvements concerning the fire protection of 
transformers are intended in Germany (Berg et al., 2010). 
 
 
Fig. 8. Flame and smoke occurring at the generator transformer; the photo on the right hand 
shows the fire extinguishing activities 
5.4 Phase-to-phase electrical fault in an electrical bus duct 
A phase-to-phase electrical fault, that lasted four to eight seconds, occurred in a 12 kV 
electrical bus duct at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant in May 2000 (Brown et al., 
2009). This bus supplied the reactor coolant and water circulating pumps, thus resulting in a 
turbine trip and consequently in a  reactor trip.  
The fault in the 12 kV bus occurred below a separate 4 kV bus from the start-up transformer, 
and smoke resulting from the HEAF caused an additional failure.  
When the circuit breaker tripped, there was a loss of power to all 4 kV vital and non-vital 
buses and a 480 V power supply to a switchyard control building, which caused a loss of 
power to the charger for the switchyard batteries. After 33 hours, plant personnel were able 
to energize the 4 kV and 480 V non-vital buses.  
This event was initiated due to the centre bus overheating causing the polyvinyl chloride 
(PVC) insulation to smoke, which lead to a failure of the adjacent bus insulation. Having 
only a thin layer of silver plating on the electrodes, noticeably flaking off in areas not 
directly affected by the arc, contributed to the high-energetic arcing fault event.  
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Other factors that caused the failure were heavy bus loading and splice joint configurations, 
torque relaxation, and undetected damage from a 1995 transformer explosion. Two photos 
of this failure are shown in Figure 9. More photos are provided in (Brown et al, 2009). 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Photographs of the damages at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant (from Brown 
et al., 2009) 
5.5 Short circuit due to fall of a crane onto cable trays 
This event occurs at a Ukrainian plant which was at that time under construction when 
work on dismounting of the lifting crane was fulfilled (IAEA, 2004).  
The crane was located near the 330/6 kV emergency auxiliary transformers TP4 and TP5 
which are designed for transformation 330 kV voltage to 6 kV for power supply of the 6kV 
AC house distribution system of the unit 4 and the emergency power supply system 6 kV 
for unit 3. They are located outside at a distance 50 m from the turbine hall of the unit 4. 
There are two metal clad switchgear rooms (with 26 cabinets and 8 switchers) about four 
meters from the emergency auxiliary transformers.  
The supply of the sub-distribution buses building from the power centre rooms (see Figure 
10), was ensured by a trestle with cable trays consisting of power, control and 
instrumentation cables for the units 3 and 4.  
All trays were provided with the cut-off fire barriers. The transformer rooms were supplied 
by an automatic fire extinguishing system, which actuated when the gas and differential 
protection actuated. 
The event started when the jib of the crane fell on the trestle with the cables passed from 
330/6 kV transformer TP 4 and TP 5 to unit 4 and broke them. The cables fell on the ground. 
The diagram of the situation after the event is provided in Figure 10 (IAEA, 2004). 
Damages of all cable trays lead to loss of instrumentation cables for relay protection of the 
transformers and the trunk line 6 kV. 
As a result the earth fault of the cables 6kV could not be disconnected rapidly. The 
emergency relay protection of the transformers during earth fault 6 kV from the side 330 kV 
with the executive current from the storage buttery for open-type distribution substation 330 
kV was not designed. 
To remove this earth fault the plant was cut off from outside high-voltage transmission lines 
330 kV by electrical protection actuation and the voltage on the power supply bus was 
decreased.  
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There was a loss of normal and emergency auxiliary power supply which resulted in a 
decrease of the frequency of ´the power supply buses of the main coolant pumps. The 
emergency protection was actuated and the reactors of units 2 and 3 were scrammed. 
The long-term exposure of this earth fault (1 min and 36´sec.) caused a high earth fault 
currents which burn the cables. This lead to a fire spread to the 6 kV supply distribution 
buses and 6 kV metal clad switchgear rooms resulting inside these rooms in high 
temperature and release of the toxic substance. Also the equipment of the transformers TP 4 
and TP 5 was damaged.  
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Diagram of the situation after the event (from IAEA, 2004) 
The earth fault has to be disconnected with differential protection of the line 330 kV but it 
was actuated with the output relays of the TP 4 and TP 5 which was damaged. 
The fire was detected by the security guard, the on-site fire brigade was informed, including 
the outside agency. The automatic fire extinguishing system was activated but stopped 
working right away because of fire pump’s power supply loss. There was no water in the 
fire mains.  
Then the fire brigade laid fire-fighting hoses and provided water with a mobile pump unit. 
Then the fire brigade  waited for the permission from the shift leader.  
In compliance with a written procedure, after elimination of the short circuit and restoration 
of the house distribution power supply the fire brigades could start fire fighting and 
extinguished the fire about one hour and thirty minutes after detection. 
5.6 A triple-pole short circuit at the grounding switch caused by an electrician 
In December 1975, a safety significant fire occurred in unit 1 of a nuclear power plant in the 
former Eastern Germany (see, e.g., Röwekamp & Liemersdorf, 1993 and NEA, 2000) . At that 
time, two units were under operation. Unit 1 was a PWR of the VVER-440-V230 type. The 
reactor had 6 loops and 2 turbine generators of 220 MWe each.  
An electrician caused a triple-pole short-circuit at the grounding switch between one of the 
exits of the stand-by transformer and the 6 kV bus bar of the 6 kV back-up distribution that 
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was not required during power operation. The circuit-breaker on the 220 kV side was 
defective at that time. Therefore, a short circuit current occurred for about 7.5 minutes until 
the circuit-breaker was actuated manually. The over current heated the 6 kV cable which 
caught fire over a long stretch in the main cable duct in the turbine building. 
The reactor building is connected to the turbine building via an intermediate building, as 
typical in the VVER plants. The 6 kV distribution is located in this building and the main 
feed water and emergency feed water pumps all are located in the adjacent turbine building. 
In the main cable routes nearly all types of cables for power supply, instrumentation and 
control were located near each other without any spatial separations or fire resistant 
coatings. In the cable route that caught fire there were, e.g., control cables of the three diesel 
generators.  
Due to the fire in the 6 kV cable, most of those cables failed. The cable failures caused a trip 
of the main coolant pumps leading to a reactor scram and the unavailability of all feed water 
and emergency feed water pumps. The heat removal from the reactor was only possible via 
the secondary side by steam release. Due to the total loss of feed water, the temperature and 
pressure in the primary circuit increased until the pressuriser safety valves opened. This 
heating was slow, about 5 h, due to the large water volumes of the six steam generators, 45 
m3 in each. In this situation one of the pressuriser safety valves was stuck open. Then the 
primary pressure decreased and a medium pressure level was obtained so that it was 
possible to feed the reactor by boron injection pumps. Due to cable faults, the 
instrumentation for the primary circuit was defective (temperature, pressuriser level). Only 
one emergency diesel could be started due to the burned control cables. The primary circuit 
could be filled up again with the aid of this one emergency diesel and one of six big boron 
injection pumps. With this extraordinary method it was possible to ensure the residual heat 
removal for hours. 
The Soviet construction team personnel incidentally at the site then installed temporarily a 
cable leading to unit 2. With this cable one of the emergency feed water pumps could be 
started and it was possible to fill the steam generator secondary side to cool down the 
primary circuit to cold shutdown conditions. Fortunately, no core damages occurred. 
Regarding the weak points with respect to fire safety, first of all, the cause for the fire has to 
be mentioned. This fire could only occur because there was no selective fusing of power 
cables. 
Another very important reason for the wide fire spreading concerning all kinds of cables 
was the cable installation. Nearly all cables for the emergency power supply of the different 
redundancies as well as auxiliary cables were installed in the same cable duct, some of them 
on the same cable tray.   
All the fire barriers were not efficient because the ignition was not locally limited but there 
were several locations of fire along the cable. 
In the common turbine building for the units 1 to 4 of the Greifswald plant with its total 
length of about 1.000 m there were no fire detectors nor automatic fire fighting systems 
installed. Therefore, the stationary fire fighting system which could only be actuated 
manually was not efficient. The design as well as the capacity of the fire fighting system 
were not sufficient. 
Although there were enough well trained fire fighting people, the fire-brigade had problems 
with manual fire fighting due to the high smoke density as there were no possibilities for an 
efficient smoke removal in the turbine hall. 
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5.7 Explosion in a switchgear room due to a failure of a circuit breaker 
In December 1996, in a PWR in Belgium the following event occurred. The operator starts a 
circulating pump (used for cooling of a condenser with river water). This is the first start-up 
of the pump since the unit was shut down.  
About eight seconds later, an explosion occurs in a non safety related circuit breaker room 
(located two floors below the control room), followed by a limited fire in the PVC control 
cables inside the cubicles. Due to some delay in the reaction time of the protection relays, 
normal (380 kV) and auxiliary (150 kV) power supply of train 1 are made unavailable. Safety 
related equipment of train 1 are supplied by the diesel generating set 1. Normal power 
supply of train 2 is still available. 
The internal emergency plan is activated and the internal fire brigade is constituted. The fire 
is rapidly extinguished by the internal fire brigade. 
As a direct consequence of the explosion five people were injured during the accident, one 
of them died ten days later. 
The fire door at the room entrance was open at the moment of the explosion; this door opens 
on a small hall giving access to the stairs and to other rooms (containing safety and non 
safety related supply boards) at the same level; all the fire doors of these rooms were closed 
at the moment of the explosion and were burst in by the explosion blast. Three other fire 
doors were damaged (one of these is located on the lower floor); some smoke exhaust 
dampers did not open due to the explosion (direct destruction of the dampers, bending of 
the actuating mechanism). One wall collapsed, another one was displaced. 
The explosion did not destroy the cubicle of the circulating pump circuit breaker; the supply 
board and the bus bar were not damaged, except for the effects of the small fire on the 
control cables; other supply boards located in the same room were not damaged. In the 
room situated in front of the room where the explosion occurred, the fire door felt down on 
a safety related supply board, causing slight damages to one cubicle (but this supply board 
remained available except for the voltage measurement). 
A comprehensive root cause analysis has been performed and has shown that the explosion 
occurred due to the failure of the circuit breaker. The failure occurred probably when the 
protection relay was spuriously actuated 0.12 seconds after the start up of the pump (over 
current protection) and led to an inadvertently opening of the circuit. 
Based on an investigation of the failing circuit breaker, it was concluded that two phases of a 
low oil content 6 kV circuit breaker did not open correctly and the next upstream protection 
device did not interrupt the faulting device. This has led to the formation of long duration 
high energy arcing faults inside the housing and to the production of intense heat release. 
This resulted in an overpressure with subsequent opening of the relief valve located at the 
upper part of the circuit breaker presumably introducing ionised gases and dispersed oil 
into the air of the cubicle/room. This mixture in combination with the arcs is supposed to be 
at the origin of the explosion. Indications of arcing between the three phases of the circuit 
breaker have been observed, resulting in a breach of the housing on two phases. Many 
investigations were conducted to identify the root cause of the circuit breaker failure 
(dielectric oil analyses, normal and penalising conditions tests, mechanical control 
valuations) but no clear explanation could be found. Moreover, the circuit breaker 
maintenance procedure was compared with the constructor recommendations and the 
practice in France. No significant difference was noticed. 
Although the explosion occurred in a non safety related supply boards room, the event was 
of general importance, because the same types of circuit breakers were also installed in 
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safety related areas. Therefore, this event was reported to IAEA and included in the IRS 
database. 
6. First insights 
Due to the safety significance of this type of events and the potential relevance for long-term 
operation of nuclear power stations there is a strong interest in these phenomena in various 
countries with nuclear energy. Investigations on high energy arcing faults are ongoing in 
several OECD/NEA member states.  
The licensees of German nuclear power plants are principally willing and able to answer the 
questionnaire concerning HEAF events as far as possible and information being available.  
In particular, experts from nuclear power plants in Northern Germany have already 
answered this questionnaire. The licensees intend to use the feedback from the operational 
experience provided by the answers to the survey and by conclusions and recommendations 
from the analysis for potential improvements of fire protection features in this respect in 
their nuclear power plants.  
The evaluation of the answers of the remaining licensees to the questionnaire is ongoing and 
is planned to be completed by the end of 2011. 
Due to the most recent experience from German nuclear power plants, it is necessary from 
the regulatory point of view to investigate high energy arcing fault events. Moreover, it 
might be helpful to investigate precursors to such events in more detail.  
Table 3 gives indications that more than 40 % of the reportable events in Germany related to 
high energy arcing faults have been reported since 2001. This underlines the increasing 
relevance of this type of events. 
Moreover, nearly half of those events, for which information regarding voltage level is not 
available, are among the most recent events whereas usually specific information is more 
difficult to collect for events in the far past. All these different activities and explanations of 
the current state-of-the-art should be supported by the evaluation of the answers to the 
German questionnaire. 
Concerning high energy arcing fault events, short circuit failure of high voltage cables 
(typically 10 kV) in cable rooms and cable ducts (channels, tunnels, etc.) is not assumed for 
German nuclear power plants at the time being. Moreover, a failure of high voltage 
switchgears (10 kV or more) and the resulting pressure increase are presumed to occur and 
to be controlled.  
Specific investigations with respect to such scenarios have resulted in additional measures 
for pressure relief inside switchgear buildings of German nuclear power plants. 
According to international fire testing standards (EN, 2009) fire barrier elements are 
designed predominantly against the thermal impact of fires given by the standard fire curve 
according ISO 834. The pressure build-up due to a HEAF is not considered as fire barrier 
design load. In the course of several events fire barrier elements such as fire doors were 
opened or deformed by a HEAF.  One example is described in 5.7. 
7. Concluding remarks and outlook 
7.1 Improvement of the basic knowledge on HEAF 
As soon as the questionnaire has been answered by the German nuclear power station 
licensees, the answers will be statistically examined and interpreted. In particular, potential 
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consequences of events with this failure mechanism on equipment adjacent to that where 
the high-energetic arcing faults occurred (particularly safety related equipment including 
cables, fire protection features) as well as HEAF events in plant areas exceeding the typical 
fire effects (smoke, soot, heat, etc.) shall be identified. The major goal of this task is to 
provide first, still rough estimates on the contribution of high energy arcing faults events to 
the core damage frequency.  
The results of the German survey may reveal additional findings on the event causes, 
possible measures either for event prevention or for limiting the consequences of such faults 
such that nuclear safety is not impaired. In this context, additional generic results from the 
OECD HEAF activity are expected. 
A review of secondary effects of fires in nuclear power plants (Forell & Einarsson, 2010) 
based to the OECD FIRE database showed that HEAFs did not only initiated fire event but 
were also secondary effect of a fire.  In two events included in the database, fire generated 
smoke propagated to an adjacent electrical cabinet, which was ignited by a HEAF. This can 
be interpreted as a special phenomenon of fire spread. In one case smoke from an intended 
brush fire spread between the near 230 kV lines and caused a phase-to-phase arc. 
As soon as the answers to the questionnaire have been analyzed in detail and the results 
from the operation feedback are known, a discussion between licensees, reviewers and 
regulators can be started on the general conclusions and potential back fitting measures and 
improvements inside the nuclear installations. 
Based on the international operating experience, state-of-the-art information and data on 
high energy arcing faults of electric components and equipment shall be collected and 
assessed with respect to the phenomena involved. In particular, potential consequences of 
events with this failure mechanism on adjacent equipment (particularly safety related 
equipment, fire protection features) and high energy arcing faults events in plant areas 
exceeding the typical fire effects (smoke, soot, heat, etc.) shall be identified. Based on the 
collected information and data a more comprehensive and traceable assessment can be 
performed. 
7.2 HEAF assessment 
The high energy arcing fault assessment approach developed in (USNRC, 2005) primarily 
represents an empirical model. As such, it depicts observations mainly based on a single 
event and characterizes a damaging zone affected this event. To capture variations in 
current and voltage level, insulation type and cabinet design a mechanistic model has been 
developed (Hyslop et al., 2008).  
Some recent studies have further developed the understanding of the high energy arcing 
faults phenomena through experimentation and re-evaluation of previous theories.  
Damage to cables and equipment by high energy impulses from arcing faults has been 
shown to be different from that caused by fires alone. Specific components, such as 
transformers, overhead power lines, and switchgears, have been identified as vulnerable to 
arc events. However, when looking at the dynamic nature of high energy arcing faults, there 
are still many factors being not well understood.   
Computational fluid dynamics models have also been used to measure the pressure and 
temperature increase (e.g. in switchgear rooms) and present reasonable results on arc events 
(Friberg & Pietsch, 1999). However, fires were not evaluated.  
The existing research is mainly limited in scope and has not yet addressed all factors 
important to perform a full-scope probabilistic fire risk assessment including high energy 
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arcing faults. In general, high energy arcing faults events have been minimally explored but 
improvements in the early quantitative results have been made.  In particular, fire PSA 
needs to assess the event behaviour beyond the initial arc-fault event itself (as past research 
has focussed) so as to encompass the issues related to the enduring fire. Issues that go 
beyond the initial arc fault event include the characterization of the potential for ignition of 
secondary combustibles, characterization of the fire growth and intensity following the 
enduring fire, and the effectiveness and timing of fire suppression efforts.  
In order to improve the probabilistic fire safety assessment approach, further research 
including experimental studies with respect to the arc mechanisms and phenomena as well 
as to the damage criteria of the relevant equipment affected by high energy arcing faults is 
needed. To better address the needs of probabilistic fire safety assessment, the scope of the 
testing will need to be expanded as compared to past studies. These research activities will 
be started in the U.S. in the near future (Hyslop et al., 2008), partially together with other 
countries interested in high energy arcing faults and their significance. 
7.3 Strategies for reducing arc flash hazards 
An arc flash fault typically results in an enormous and nearly instantaneous increase in light 
intensity in the vicinity of the fault. Light intensity levels often rise to several thousand 
times normal ambient lighting levels. For this reason most, if not all, arc flash detecting 
relays rely on optical sensors to detect this rapid increase in light intensity. For security 
reasons, the optical sensing logic is typically further supervised by instantaneous over 
current elements operating as a fault detector. Arc flash detection relays are capable of 
issuing a trip signal in as little as 2.5 ms after initiation of the arcing fault (Inshaw & Wilson, 
2004). 
Arc flash relaying compliments existing conventional relaying. The arc flash detection relay 
requires a rapid increase in light intensity to operate and is designed with the single 
purpose of detecting very dangerous explosive-like conditions resulting from an arc flash 
fault. It operates independently and does not need to be coordinated with existing relaying 
schemes. 
Once the arc flash fault has been detected, there are at least two design options. One option 
involves directly tripping the upstream bus breakers. Since the arc flash detection time is so 
short, overall clearing time is essentially reduced to the operating time of the upstream 
breaker. A second option involves creating an intentional three-phase bus fault by 
energizing a high speed grounding switch. This approach shunts the arcing energy through 
the high-speed grounding switch and both faults are then cleared by conventional upstream 
bus protection. Because the grounding switch typically closes faster than the upstream 
breaker opens, this approach will result in lower incident energy levels than the first 
approach. However, it also introduces a second three-phase bolted fault on the system and it 
requires that a separate high speed grounding switch be installed and operational (Inshaw 
& Wilson, 2004).  
To prevent or alleviate HEAF effects, manufacturers have been working to develop arc 
arrestors and arc detection methods and to improve composite materials in the switchgear 
interior. The experiments conducted (see e.g. Jones et al., 2000) indicated that research and 
testing are required to determine the voltage level, insulation type, and construction where 
bus insulation may help extinguish or sustain arc once established. The use of such devices 
would likely impact estimates of fire ignition frequency for such events, but no methods 
currently exist to account for the presence, or absence, of such equipment. 
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